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It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to this volume dedicated to the critical 
celebration of Stephen Schiffer’s very considerable philosophical achievements. My focus will be 
on his recent work on vagueness.1  
 The broad direction of Schiffer’s researches in this area has been to give priority to what 
we may call the characterisation problem: the problem of saying what the vagueness of 
expressions of natural language consists in or, more specifically – since Schiffer takes it as a given 
that the vagueness he is targeting consist in a propensity of vague expressions to give rise to 
borderline cases —the problem of saying what being a borderline case of the concept expressed by 
a vague expression consists in.  This has not been a main preoccupation of most of the work in the 
field since the vagueness “boom” started in the mid 1970s. There has been a tendency to jump 
straight into devising semantic theories for vague languages, usually aimed at twin desiderata of 
saving classical logic and dissolving the various paradoxes of vagueness, with a principal focus on 
the standard sorites, and occasional glances at the Forced March, and others.2  Of course, such 
work has inevitably implicated commitment to broad conceptions of vagueness, and of borderline 
cases, of various kinds.  The classical epistemicist approach, for example, conceives of borderline 
cases as instances whose correct classification in terms of the relevant concept is, for reasons it 
attempts to explain, unknowable.  Semantic indeterminist approaches, by contrast, tend (often 
implicitly) to conceive of borderline cases as items to which the concept in question neither applies 
nor fails to apply and as coming about because our practice with the concept leaves it, in effect, 
merely partially defined and so ‘gappy’. A variation on this, still semantic indeterminist, regards 
vagueness as consisting in a phenomenon akin to divided reference, whereby a predicate, for 
example, may be associated with a range of extensionally distinct best candidates to be the 
property it refers to; borderline cases are then items which exemplify some but not all of these 
properties.  Finally some have attempted to see vagueness as constituted in rebus—in the world, 
rather than in meaning or in our ignorance:  being a borderline case, so viewed, is a matter of being 
situated within a penumbra, as it were, like the position of a point between the light and the dark in 
the image cast by an intense but blurred shadow.3  Generally speaking, however, proponents of 
                                                
1 See the works of Schiffer’s cited in the References section. Schiffer’s focus, of course, is on soritical 
vagueness — the kind of vagueness that is characteristic of expressions that are prone to give rise to a sorites 
paradox. Other linguistic phenomena that are sometimes described as involving vagueness include generality 
(lack of specificity), partial definition, family resemblances and criterial conflicts. I am concerned only with 
soritical vagueness in what follows. 
2 For example, the so-called Problem of the Many (for a definitive overview, see Weatherson [2003]).  
3 As far as I am aware, no one has attempted a fully general view of vagueness along these lines. 
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these various kinds of view have not devoted the same degree of attention to elucidating and 
defending their (implicit) commitments concerning the nature of vagueness and borderline cases as 
they have devoted to the development of formal semantical theories, and to criticising opposing 
views and attempting to address the paradoxes.  Yet one would naturally suppose that the 
characterisation problem should be a locus of developed discussion rather than one of 
presupposition.  For until we have a properly argued account of what vagueness is, how can one 
possibly expect to know what kind of semantic theory for vague expressions might be best 
motivated, let alone how the most appropriate kind of semantic theory might assist with the 
disarming of the sorites paradox and other problems?   
 I find much to agree with in both the general approach and the details of Schiffer’s work on 
the problems of vagueness.  We concur, first and foremost, in prioritising the question of the nature 
of vagueness and the characterisation of borderline cases – though I confess to being a little less 
confident than Schiffer that it is possible, or necessary, to accomplish this in an exceptionless, 
biconditional formulation.  We are also agreed in rejecting standard semantic indeterminist, 
epistemicist and in rebus views, proposing instead that the characterisation of vagueness will best 
proceed, broadly, in terms of aspects of the distinctive attitudinal psychology involved in the 
exercise of judgement involving vague concepts.  And we are at one in repudiating “third 
possibility” conceptions of borderline cases: conceptions according to which borderline case 
propositions— propositions ascribing a vague concept, or its contrary, to items in the borderline 
area of the concept in question—enjoy a status inconsistent with that of simple truth, or simple 
falsity.  Examples of third possibility status include lack of truth value, the possession of a third 
truth value, the possession of any of a range of intermediate truth values, and the (dialetheist) idea 
that they possess both (polar) truth values.   
 Significant differences, though, remain. Some of the more major concern the epistemic 
status of borderline cases – in particular Schiffer subscribes to the widespread view of Verdict 
Exclusion (VE), viz. that (it is known that) no polar verdict about a borderline case proposition is 
knowledgeable. We also disagree about the kind of attitudinal psychological story to try to tell 
about borderline cases: Schiffer holds that it should give a central place to his notion of vagueness-
related partial belief (VPB), although he finds some merit in my notion of quandary;4 whereas I 
would prefer to centralise the notion of quandary, although I think there is insight contained in 
Schiffer’s notion of VPB. Third, although neither of us is prepared straightforwardly to endorse the 
use of classical logic in reasoning with vague concepts, Schiffer proposes no alternative, holding 
merely that it is indeterminate whether certain principles of classical logic – including, strikingly, 
modus ponens – hold good for reasoning among vague judgements, whereas I have argued that the 
strongest logic justified for such reasoning would involve qualification of the law of excluded 
middle for atomic statements and of double negation elimination for compound ones (and so 
approximate an intuitionistic logic).   
 The considerations to follow will focus on these points of disagreement. They are offered 
in a spirit of collaboration, in the hope of furthering progress towards the best possible version of 
the broad genre of account to which Stephen and I are both drawn.5 
 
§1  Vagueness-Related Partial Belief 
It is plausible enough that in the passage along the elements of a typical sorites series for a 
predicate F, we pass from cases where we are completely confident in the correctness of the 
                                                
4 More accurately, he finds merit in a notion of quandary in whose characterisation his notion of VPB plays a 
central role, and which is accordingly rather different from mine.  
5 My own views are principally developed (and developing) in Wright [2001], [2003], [2003a] and [2007]. 
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verdict, “F”, through a region where our satisfaction with any particular verdict is qualified and 
much diminished and then on to a region where confidence builds again in the contrary of the 
original verdict culminating, as the series progresses, in complete satisfaction once more.  I think 
the phenomenology of whatever it is that seemingly decreases and then increases again in this way 
needs subtle description, and that it may not be most felicitous to regard it as a form of partial 
belief.  But I don’t think Schiffer fundamentally disagrees about that.  What is striking is that the 
attitude involved, although allowing of degree, seems to differ from standard partial belief (SPB) 
or credence in a number of respects.  As Schiffer observes, credences greater than 0 but less than 1 
are typically based on evidence which is conceived of as falling short of the best possible evidence, 
and so are often attended by a conception of how the relevant evidence might be improved.  They 
also tend to be associated with beliefs about likelihood: to believe to some quite high degree that it 
will rain tomorrow will tend to be to believe (absolutely) that it is quite likely that it will rain 
tomorrow.  Neither of these features is replicated by the kind of partial satisfaction, or confidence, 
one may have in a verdict that applies a vague concept to a case that lies outside its polar regions 
but is, say, rather closer to one than the other.  But the defining and single most striking feature of 
VPB is its apparent departure from the laws of classical probability. Classically, my confidence in 
the conjunction of a pair of (independent) propositions in each of which I place merely partial 
confidence should approximate the product of the degrees of belief thereby reposed in the 
conjuncts — and so, when both those degrees are quite small, should be very small.  But it does 
not seem that we would be inclined to regard a conjunction whose conjuncts were a pair of 
independent propositions, each ascribing a vague property to a more or less “central” borderline 
case of it, as very much less credible than its conjuncts. Indeed there seems no clear sense in which 
it would be rational to be any less confident about the conjunction that about the conjuncts. 
Imagine a cube of a metal which gradually changes colour as it changes temperature — though 
neither as a result of the other—and suppose it comes to sit simultaneously on the borderlines 
between red and orange and between warm and hot.  Imagine we find we have no preference for 
the verdict “Cube is warm” over “Cube is hot” and vice versa; and similarly with respects to the 
verdicts, “Cube is orange”, and “Cube is red”.  It does not seem likely that asked whether we 
would assent to “Cube is orange and Cube is warm” we would feel any more negative about doing 
so than about assent to the individual conjuncts. 6  And no reason is apparent why we should. 
 The nature of this kind of partial confidence, or satisfaction—for in truth I am not sure how 
best to represent it— could certainly stand further clarification.  What exactly is it that varies in 
degree, and how may the variation be measured?  Betting behaviour, a classic recourse for the 
explanation of the functional role of standard partial belief, is obviously inappropriate here since 
there is no question of an ‘outcome’ where a borderline case is concerned – so nothing to bet on.  
But although it is arguable that Schiffer has (so far) left issues to do with the functional role and 
explanatory potential of VPB less clear than is desirable, I think it is hard to dismiss the 
phenomenon and that the prima facie case for its reality is strong.  The question is whether it can 
take the weight that Schiffer wants to place upon it in his account of vagueness. 
 About that I continue to have misgivings. Schiffer’s strategy is to try to characterise 
borderline cases directly in terms of the notion of VPB.  More accurately, it is to characterise them 
in terms of the notion of VPB* —vagueness-related partial belief formed under epistemically ideal 
circumstances.  I have already noted elsewhere7 certain difficulties with the proposal developed in 
                                                
6 As Elia Zardini has emphasised to me in conversation, however, Schiffer’s point is served merely if any 
lowering of satisfaction in the conjunction is (appreciably) less than would correspond to the ‘multiplication’. 
7 Wright [2006] 
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Schiffer [2003], to which Schiffer has since responded.8  I won’t pursue the detail of that particular 
discussion here, but will outline a more general, though related consideration.   
 Even if we take the notion of VPB, and its characteristically non-classical behaviour, to be 
adequately clear, and attested for Schiffer’s purposes, any claim that it is of the essence of grasping 
vague concepts to be prone to VPB with respect to appropriate judgements that involve them looks 
to be too strong on at least two counts.9  Consider first the case of Tim.  Tim passes, by any 
reasonable tests, as a master of a wide range of vague concepts expressible in his natural language.  
But he has persuaded himself, by a variety of more or less philosophically questionable moves, of 
the correctness of the classical epistemicist conception of vagueness.  Accordingly, he conceives of 
each of the vague expressions in his language as expressing a property (or other appropriate form 
of semantic value) that actually has a completely sharply bounded extension.  The effect is that 
although his atomic vague judgements are perfectly orthodox, he is very insistent on the use of 
classical logic in reasoning with vague judgements and very confident about the principle of 
bivalence as applied to them.  Moreover, and crucially, although his satisfaction with/confidence in 
the vague (atomic) judgements that he makes varies in degree after the broad manner of VPB, he 
does – as he should – regard the conjunction of hard cases as increasing the risk of error, and so is 
prone to “multiply down” – to reject conjunctions in cases where he is not prepared to flat out 
reject either of the (independent) conjuncts.  It would be, I think, strained to insist that Tim’s 
superstitions about the semantics of vague expressions are inconsistent with his perfectly well 
understanding them – with his fully possessing the concepts that they express.  Rather he is making 
a philosophical mistake — the history of the philosophy of language is littered with such 
mistakes—about the kind of meanings possessed by expressions which he perfectly well 
understands.  But if that is the right description of him, it is not of the essence of a grasp of vague 
concepts to enter into attitudes of VPB towards certain judgements involving them.   
 Alternatively, consider Hugh, an individual who is maximally opinionated.10  Hugh’s 
opinions know no half measures.  If he takes a view about anything, he takes it with complete 
conviction.  Yet the pattern and spread of his judgements involving vague concepts are otherwise 
normal.  Thus, in the borderline region, of some concept, he sometimes has no view, or returns a 
verdict inconsistent with one he has given before, —in which case he takes the line that what he 
said before was “completely wrong”.  He may even display signs of hesitancy in judging 
borderline cases – but if he finally overcomes it and is moved to judgement, that judgement is once 
again completely confident.  In short, while the extensional profile of Hugh’s judgements 
involving vague concepts is normal, there is none of the phenomenology of partial belief.  And 
again, it would seem an overreaction to the case to view this psychological quirk as calling into 
question Hugh’s grasp of the concepts concerned.   
 I think these cases show that while Schiffer is correct to have emphasised the role of 
something akin to partial belief in the normal attitudinal psychology of vague judgement, — and 
deserves credit for the insight that this kind of partial belief may, perfectly rationally, display the 
non-classical features he emphasises, —it is wrong to see it as belonging to the nature of the 
understanding of vague concepts to involve a disposition to partial belief of this kind, or to write it 
into the possession-conditions for vague concepts that one should be so inclined.  
 
 
                                                
8 Schiffer [2006] 
9 I take Schiffer to be suggesting such a claim in his [2006] though it is another question whether he needs to. 
10 I am indebted here to Elia Zardini. 
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§2  Verdict Exclusion 
“Verdict” is here a term of art. A verdict about a statement involving a vague concept is a 
judgement that it takes one in particular of the two polar values, true and false. The thesis of 
Verdict Exclusion (VE) is that for borderline cases of the concept concerned, no such verdict can 
be an expression of knowledge. Concerning (VE) itself, three possible views are relevant: (i) that it 
is known to be false — so known that knowledgeable verdicts, of truth or falsity respectively, are 
possible for, say, predications of a vague concept of its borderline cases; (ii) that it is known to be 
true — so known that borderline cases are cases where knowledge of the relevant kind of verdict is 
impossible; and (iii) agnosticism — that neither view about the status of (VE) is mandated. 
Schiffer’s view is (ii), a contention that he finds intuitive and regards as enforced in any case by 
the role of VPB in the individuation of borderline cases.11 I, by contrast, believe that the correct 
stance overall is (iii): we should be agnostic about the possibility of knowledgeable verdicts in 
borderline cases.  
 The disagreement is crucial. Verdict Exclusion is no less a nodal issue for the proper 
characterisation of vagueness than Third Possibility, in whose rejection Schiffer and I, as noted, 
concur. In my view, a repudiation of both Third Possibility and Verdict Exclusion — that is, a 
rejection of both theses as unjustified — belongs with a more general liberal stance concerning the 
epistemic nature of borderline cases. In this section, I will outline some motivations for liberalism 
and defend it against certain objections, including some of Schiffer’s. However what I take to be 
Schiffer's principal reason for endorsing (VE)— and hence for rejecting liberalism—has to do with 
his conception of VPB as independently excluding potentially knowledgeable belief.12 The issues 
around that impress me as very difficult, and I must reserve discussion of them for another 
occasion. 
 Schiffer and I are both impressed by the datum that ordinary speakers do not treat the 
borderline area of a vague distinction as one where competence mandates silence or suppression of 
any inclination to offer a verdict, however qualified. If something is on the borderline between red 
and orange, say, it won't call your competence with those concepts — or your eyes — into 
question if you are inclined to describe it as red, or for that matter as orange. One is entitled, if one 
is so moved, to a verdict in the borderline area, so entitled — presumably —to the opinion which 
that verdict expresses.  
 A perhaps more forceful expression of this entitlement intuition —since free of any 
demand on one’s preferred understanding of “borderline cases”—is this. Consider any typical 
soritical series running from clear instances of F to clear instances of non-F by steps small enough 
to service a sorites paradox as plausible as any. Then— this is the intuition— there will be no 
element of this series about which it is mandatory to return neither the verdict “F” nor the verdict 
“non-F”. A polar verdict is always permissible provided it is sincere; there are no cases that 
mandate a third possibility type of response. If someone prefers to understand “borderline case” in 
such a way that the knowledge that something is a borderline case ought to inhibit any verdict, 
then a way of expressing the entitlement intuition is that there are no clear—definite— borderline 
cases in a typical sorites series. The clear cases on the other hand are those where only one polar 
verdict is permissible. 
  Liberalism is the simplest theoretical accommodation of the entitlement intuition. It is the 
view that it is always permissible to return a verdict about a borderline case simply because it is —
                                                
11 See Schiffer [forthcoming], sections 6 and 7 
12 I take his view to be that the sort of qualified acceptance involved in VPB-ing P to some significantly greater 
degree than not-P is categorically unsuited to serve as the doxastic ingredient in knowledge. 
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in a sense we need to clarify — open what to think about such cases and open, indeed, whether in 
thinking one thing in particular, you are knowledgeable. This openness is, at a minimum, what 
goes with agnosticism about Third Possibility and Verdict Exclusion respectively: if neither thesis 
is justified, there is no call to stifle aspects of our natural practice and inclinations to judgement 
that would be inappropriate if they were true.13 
  Let me quickly summarise some considerations which I take to support liberalism and then 
—in the next section—respond to some objections to it. First, to emphasise the implausibility of 
the idea of a datum of Third Possibility. If Third Possibility were known to obtain, even if in just 
one case, we would know that any polar opinion about that case was mistaken. But we do not 
behave as though we think we know any such thing: someone who returns a (perhaps suitably 
qualified) polar verdict about a borderline case is never thereby automatically treated as revealing 
a mistake, or incompetence —rather we feel, to repeat, that they are, ceteris paribus, precisely 
entitled to their opinion. The manifestations of judgement of borderline cases include hesitation, 
inability to form an opinion, weakness of opinion, instability of opinion, and conflict among judges 
whose competence is not in question.  But convergence in patterns of hesitation, or non-opinion, 
still less any sense that ‘no opinion’ is sometimes the uniquely appropriate response, is at best 
contingently (and doubtfully) involved. Mastery of a vague concept seems to involve no essential 
exercise of a concept of any kind of third possibility.  
  Now to Verdict Exclusion. If (VE) were known to obtain, even if in just one case, we 
would know that any polar opinion about that case was, whatever else, not the product of a 
successful feat of cognition. It would be something caused, no doubt, by relevant features of the 
case but not a fitting cognitive response to them. And if (VE) we known to obtain generally in the 
borderline area, then our propensity to verdicts — albeit weak and unstable verdicts—about cases 
lying within it would seem to amount to no more than a kind of cognitive incontinence. It seems 
that to know such a thing about opinions one is inclined to form should have the effect of 
undermining them. So knowledge of Verdict Exclusion is also in tension with the entitlement 
intuition. Our sense is that no matter what case in a sorites series we consider, it is consistent with 
full perceptual and conceptual competence if someone takes a (perhaps suitably qualified but) 
polar view of it. There are no cases, even towards the 'middle', where it is eo ipso incompetent to 
have a (suitably qualified) polar view. However a presumption of knowledgeability—or at least 
warrant—is a condition of rational opinion: for a rational judge, judging that P is judging that P is 
what one ought to think. But one who thinks that (VE) is known says in effect that we know that 
there is no mandate for opinion in some cases in a sorites series—there is, in borderline cases, 
nothing that ought to be thought. In such cases, thinking that P is what one ought to think, is 
therefore mistaken. (VE) thus has the effect that opinions which, according to the entitlement 
intuition, are consistent with competence, are ungrounded and hence not competent.  If (VE) is 
part of the best theory of vagueness, then the best theory is one according to which our actual 
practice in all but definite cases  is irrational/incompetent. It is hard to envisage that a best theory 
should have that feature. 
  Finally, there are difficulties for (VE) involved in its interaction with principles of 
Evidential Constraint (EC). The best formulation of the latter for any particular type of judgement 
is doubtless going to be controversial. But (EC) is undeniably intuitive for secondary qualities 
generally and for a wide class of predicates of casual observation—“heap”, “bald”, etc., —that 
                                                
13 In refusing to affirm that no verdict about a borderline cases can be knowledgeable, the liberal does not, of 
course, intend to exempt such verdicts from other normal controls on knowledge ascription — the point is only: we 
have no justification for thinking that knowledgeability is excluded just by a verdict’s concerning a borderline case.  
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foster sorites paradoxes. We are not, intuitively, up for the idea of baldness that cannot be 
recognised as such in principle, or heaps whose heaphood would elude the detection of even the 
most fortunately situated judge. Yet if Verdict Exclusion were known to obtain, even if in just one 
case, we would know that (EC) —in the form of the two conditionals: 
 If P, then it is feasible to know P 
 If not-P, then it is feasible to know not-P 
—would have to fail in that case (on pain of the obvious contradiction.)  
 This, it seems to me, is simply too strong a result to swallow. Maybe (EC) is 
controversial,14 and perhaps it is implausible for certain vague expressions.15 But it is already a 
problem if it is not implausible for all — since our knowledge of (VE) is being supposed to be 
characteristic of borderline cases without exception: if (VE) and (EC) are (known to be) 
inconsistent, the plausibility of taking (VE) to be known for an arbitrary vague predicate, say, is 
hostage to that of taking it that we actually know that (EC) fails for it. The proponent of (VE) owes 
an explanation of what he takes the content of this knowledge to be. And if it is, as naturally 
construed, that colours, baldness, heaps and so on can all be undetectable, even under 
unimprovable conditions of observation, then I do not think we do know anything of the sort, for a 
very wide class of vague concepts.16  
 
§3  Stabilising liberalism  
On the other side, there are a number of more or less intuitive objections to liberalism, some 
amounting to direct arguments for (VE). While the matter requires a much fuller treatment than I 
have space for here, I’ll try to address at least some of the anti-liberal considerations known to me 
and point up some of the issues on which further clarity is needed. 
                                                
14 It is, of course, in tension everywhere with Williamson’s thesis that knowledge is subject to margins of error 
in a sense that requires that knowing that P holds of circumstances C entails that any case within some fixed 
margin of difference of C is also a case where P holds. I’ll come back to this below.  
15 Schiffer [forthcoming] suggests “brave”. 
16 Schiffer [forthcoming] suggests that the motivation for EC confuses the above conditionals with the (in the 
relevant, plausible cases) acceptable weakenings: 
 If Definitely P, then it is feasible to know P 
 If Definitely not-P, then it is feasible to know not-P 
This is no help, however without a developed account of the difference in the truth conditions of the original and 
weakened formulations, and a story about how exactly the original versions are supposed to fail. Recall that, as 
noted in the main text, even the supposition that we do not know that the original conditionals fail is inconsistent 
with the claim that (VE) is known. 
 Here is a related point, due to Zardini. Consider the claim— with which the epistemicist is comfortable, though 
not, I would imagine, Schiffer — that some nth case in the series is such that either it is F (say, looks red) and we 
cannot feasibly know that or it is not-F and that we cannot feasibly know that. Formally, 
  (∃n){(Fn & ~ it is feasible to know (Fn)) V (~Fn & ~ it is feasible to know (~Fn))} 
That is something which, if we do not believe that there is any such n, we may very well want to deny. 
Intuitionistically and classically, the denial is equivalent to: 
(*)  (∀n){~(Fn & ~ it is feasible to know (Fn)) & ~(~Fn & ~ it is feasible to know (~Fn))} 
And (*) is already enough to yield aporia when conjoined with (VE). (VE) is inconsistent with the denial that 
there are any elements in a sorites series for looks red which look red but cannot be known to do so, or which 
don’t look red and cannot be known to do that. If (pace the epistemicist) one can rationally doubt there are any 
such elements, one cannot coherently endorse (VE). 
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 Schiffer himself17 offers two intuitive thoughts on behalf of (VE). The first, very simply, is 
that 
“it’s as much of a platitude to say that 
 If someone knows that S, then it’s determinately true that S 
as it is to say that 
 If someone knows that S, then S.”18 
Assuming the standard kind of characterisation of S’s being borderline, viz. that it is neither 
determinately true that S nor determinately true that not-S, it follows that no-one ever knows a 
borderline S. But I reply that Schiffer’s platitude is clearly that only if “determinately” carries the 
sense of a kind of particle of emphasis, like “actually’ in one common kind of use, or “indeed”. 
When it is so understood, to characterise a borderline case for S as a situation where it is neither 
determinately true that S nor determinately true that not-S is, in effect, to endorse Third Possibility 
—which Schiffer does not. 
 Schiffer’s second intuitive thought invites us to reflect 
“on one’s epistemic position when confronted with what one knows to be a borderline proposition.  
Suppose that you are holding a ball in your hands in circumstances that are as good as you can conceive of 
them getting for judging the ball’s color.  You are certain you know what color the ball is, whether or not 
you have a word for that color in your vocabulary; you know that you have mastery of the concept of red; 
and you know with certainty that the color you know the ball to have is not one you can now justifiably say 
either is or is not red.  Furthermore, you cannot even conceive of how, given all you know, you could come 
to have warrant for judging either that the ball is red, or that it isn’t red.  You rightly take yourself to be in 
the best possible position to verify whether or not the ball is red, and you can’t imagine what you could 
conceivably find out that would give you knowledge that the ball was, or wasn’t, red.  Given all that, I 
would think that you would be entirely justified in thinking that it’s impossible, given the obtaining facts, 
for you, or anyone else, to know whether or not the ball is red.  Examples involving any other sorites-prone 
concept can be used to make the same point.”19 
 
I think the portion of this up to but excluding the last two sentences nicely characterises some of 
the phenomenology of quandary.20 It is indeed in such a situation hard to conceive of any 
improvement in one’s epistemic position which one could foresee would sway the balance. But to 
find oneself unmoved to an opinion by evidence of which one has no clear conception of a possible 
improvement justifies the claim that there is no knowing in the case in question only if one knows, 
first, that one’s lack of a clear concept of a possible improvement is an indicator that there is no 
possible improvement—which raises interesting issues which I will not here go into—and, more 
crucially, second, that one’s present evidence is not enough for knowledge: that had one been 
moved to a verdict on the basis of the very same experience and collateral beliefs, one’s present 
quandary discloses that being so moved would have been inappropriate, rather than the other way 
round. But you don’t know that. Had you in the same circumstances been moved—marginally—to 
the opinion that the ball is red, it would go with that opinion to think that coming to no view in the 
same circumstances would—marginally—underplay the evidence. Do you know now that that 
would be an inappropriate reaction?  
                                                
17 Schiffer [forthcoming], p. ?? 
18 Schiffer [forthcoming], p. ?? 
19 Schiffer [forthcoming], p. ??  
20 Although the bit about knowing “with certainty that the color you know the ball to have is not one you can 
now justifiably say either is or is not red” is too strong. 
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 Here next is an argument21 that purports to commit liberalism to an actual contradiction.  
Suppose that Aye and Nay come to different (but suitably qualified) polar verdicts about a 
borderline case of F. Liberalism — specifically, agnosticism about (VE) —seems committed to 
saying that it is not known that Aye is not knowledgeable, and it is not known that Nay is not 
knowledgeable. But this pair of claims, given only uncontroversial proof-theoretic properties of 
knowledge, is unstable. For the latter claim seems to imply that  
 ~K(~K~(Fk)),  
and the former that 
 ~K(~K(Fk)) 
And from these, given factivity and closure for ‘K’, we get, by elementary moves, that 
 ~K(Fk) & ~K~(Fk) 
So: on the —apparently—liberal supposition that it is not known that either polar verdict is not 
knowledgeable, we appear to have shown that neither polar verdict is knowledgeable! This 
conclusion will go for all polar disagreements about borderline cases. So in no such disagreement 
is any knowledgeable opinion involved, just as VE requires, and contrary to liberalism. 
 I think the right reaction to this objection is that it points up the need for a distinction in the 
interpretation of the various occurrences of the operator  “K”.  Liberalism indeed cannot be 
coherently expressed otherwise. But what distinction? The general idea is that we try to be open to 
the possibility that any particular opinion about a borderline case may be knowledgeable, including 
both one's own, if one has one, and that, possibly conflicting, of others. But obviously, if Aye's 
opinion is that P, then she ought to think that anyone who thinks otherwise is wrong, so not 
knowledgeable.  What liberalism requires is that, consistently with thinking that he doesn’t know, 
Aye should somehow nevertheless allow that Nay could be knowledgeable, even thinking what he 
actually does in the world as it actually is. What is the modality there?  
 It's the same as that whereby, when you hold any opinion of which you are not entirely 
sure, you may concede, consistently with retaining that opinion, that you could be wrong. I 
carefully count the marbles in a bag, and get a largish number. If I am right about the number, then 
given the way I arrived at my belief—by a careful count—it seems reasonable to say that I know 
what it is. But perhaps you nag me that even careful counts can involve error when largish 
numbers are involved, and I am thereby moved to concede that I could be wrong. What is the 
content of that concession? It had better not be tantamount to the admission that I do not know, —
after all, my belief may be true and formed by careful execution of a reliable, indeed canonical 
method. So the concession needs to be weaker. But nor does it seem entirely happy to view me as 
admitting that I do not know that I know; for if we are understanding knowledge in enough of an 
externalist way to allow that I may still actually know the number of marbles in the bag, the 
thought invites itself that I may still (so to say, externally) actually know that I know that I do. A 
better suggestion is that what I concede is the right to claim to know.  I opine that P but I do not 
claim to know that P, though nor do I admit that I do not know it.  
 So, let’s try that distinction in the context of Aye and Nay: Aye’s opinion that P commits 
him to holding that Nay does not know not-P; but Nay’s knowing not-P is nevertheless consistent 
with everything that Aye regards herself as in position to claim to know—since she does not regard 
herself as in position to claim to know P. Nay’s knowing not-P is a possibility for Aye in that 
somewhat qualified sense of epistemic possibility. Again,  this is not the same as saying that it is 
consistent with everything Aye in fact knows—not if one thing she may in fact know is P. 
                                                
21 From Rosenkranz [2005] 
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 The crucial thing is thus that, when moved to a verdict in the borderline area, one is in no 
position to claim to know (although still in position to consider that one may know.) This requires, 
to stress, that the things which one is in position to claim to know are a potentially narrower class 
than those which in fact one does know. Indeed it requires, I readily acknowledge, a more general 
account of the notion of one’s “being in position to claim” and an explanation of its potential to 
carry a narrower extension than one’s actual knowledge. I do believe in the good standing of and 
need for such a notion, but I cannot argue for that here.22 
 To review the original argument in the light of this distinction. Let “RP” express that one is 
in position to claim to know P. Then the ingredients in the liberal supposition become 
 ~R(~K~P), and 
 ~R(~KP) 
Given that R is closed, (and K factive) we still get 
 ~RP and ~R~P 
But that is now no problem—just the (agnostic) result that no one is in position to claim 
knowledge of a verdict in a borderline case.  
 To summarise, both the following liberal-seeming claims — 
 1. No-one is in position to know that any polar verdict about a borderline case is, just in virtue of its 
subject matter and specific polarity, not knowledgeable. 
 2. No-one should commit themselves to thinking that any particular polar verdict about a borderline 
case is, just in virtue of its subject matter and specific polarity, not knowledgeable — 
 
are incoherent and are no part of the commitments of liberalism. The first commits one who 
endorses it to the premises of the Aye-Nay reductio. The second is inconsistent with the 
entitlement intuition, since anyone who takes a polar view of a borderline case naturally commits 
themselves to thinking that the opposing view is false, and therefore not knowledgeable. What, I 
am suggesting, is a commitment of liberalism is this 
 
 3. No-one is in position to claim to know that any polar verdict about a borderline case is, just in 
virtue of its subject matter and specific polarity, not knowledgeable.  
 
We are entitled, when so moved, to have polar opinions about borderline cases. When we do, we 
are committed to thinking that contrary such opinions are not true, and so not knowledgeable. But 
we are in no position to claim to know that a given such opinion is not true, or not knowledgeable. 
And we are also in no position to claim to know that a given such opinion is true, or is 
knowledgeable.  
 There is one final powerful-looking extant argument in favour of (VE), and hence 
antithetical to liberalism.  It is Timothy Williamson’s argument that inexact knowledge requires a 
margin for error, with the latter notion understood in such a way as to entail that cases within a 
fixed margin of difference from a case known to be F are likewise F. This enforces the negation of 
the claim that all the EC-conditionals of the form,  
 If Fk, then it is feasible to know that Fk, 
                                                
22 It is argued for in Wright [forthcoming]. 
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for k an element in a given sorites series, are true.23 It dos not, except classically, enforce the idea 
that some in particular are false; it does not, except classically, even preclude thinking that there is 
none that is false; not does it force us to conceive of the falsity of such a conditional as consisting 
in the F-ness of the relevant k but unfeasibility of knowledge that Fk. There is therefore a project, 
for those, like the present author, for whom intuitionistic distinctions will be respected in the logic 
of choice for vague statements, of exploring whether or the extent to which Williamson’s argument 
might somehow be stopped short of full out contradiction with liberalism. But my own expectation 
is that something will have to give here. Williamson’s proposal is driven by two thoughts: (i) that 
knowledge requires reliability of the relevant method of belief formation, and (ii) that in creatures 
of limited powers of discrimination, reliable detection of a characteristic will be compromised if 
changes too slight for them to discriminate can make the difference between its applying and its 
failing to apply.  There is evident merit in both thoughts. Where there may be room for manoeuvre 
is over whether, as best understood, they properly combine to enforce the general truth of 
Williamson’s putative corollary, that cases within a fixed margin of difference from a case known 
to be F are likewise F. But the matter needs a careful separate treatment — something I cannot 
embark on here.24 
 Specific arguments apart, it is clear that there is a strong intuitive pull, felt by many 
philosophers of very different theoretical predispositions about vagueness, to accept (VE). What is 
the root of it? One motivation, undoubtedly, is the intuitive predilection for Third Possibility 
conceptions of borderline cases. Another is the questionable idea that knowledge requires 
subjective certainty, coupled with the thought that the borderline region is one of often tentative, 
uncertain opinion. A third would regard the characteristic instability of opinions in the borderline 
region as disqualifying them as knowledge—but that wouldn’t justify the modal component in 
(VE): those drawn to it are unlikely to feel any better about a verdict about a borderline case which 
just happened to be stable. My guess is that the single most powerful pre-theoretic motive for 
endorsement of (VE) is the idea that the opposed contention, that knowledge in borderline cases is 
possible, owes a concrete conception of a number of matters that present as moot, to say the least 
— indeed as imponderable. What kind of fact could it be that a case on the borderline of “red” is 
actually red?— won’t one need recourse to something approaching the epistemicist’s idea of 
inscrutable semantic mechanisms linking the predicate to a property of which we may have no 
adequate conception to make sense of such a fact? And if one goes in that direction, what would 
make an opinion that happened to coincide with the fact knowledgeable?  
 In short, it looks as though a worked out denial of (VE) will involve all the problems that 
discourage most from endorsing epistemicism, together with the additional baggage of explaining 
how the kind of sublimated facts in which epistemicism believes are in principle open to 
knowledge. But if this is the primary, most basic motive for endorsing (VE), it should come with a 
sense of liberation to realise that a justifiable recoil from this cluster of issues and problems should 
actually motivate no such thing.  We are not, in denying that (VE) is justified, affirming its 
negation. We incur none of the distinctive obligations of that affirmation. The liberal view is that 
we do not know (VE); but nor do we claim to know that knowledge is possible in the borderline 
area. We have, accordingly, no obligation to provide a further account of the facts of which it 
would be knowledge or of how knowledge of them might be reached. 
 
                                                
23 We assume that each successive element in the sorites lies within the relevant margin of difference of its 
predecessor. 
24 Useful discussion bearing on the issue may be found in Mott [1998], Williamson [2000b], and Egré [2006] 
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§4  Quandary and the Characterisation problem  
I turn to the question of whether the notion of quandary might be usefully deployed to address the 
characterisation problem. An early decision needs to be taken about the form in which to try to 
address the problem, since there are several interrelated questions here. They include: 
(1) In what does the vagueness of a vague expression consist? 
(2) What is a borderline case object/item? 
(3) What is a borderline proposition? 
One natural proposal is to try to answer (3) first, after which the answers to questions (1) and (2) 
can respectively consist in elaboration of these two basic thoughts: 
 (1) That the vagueness of E consists in the fact that its presence in token utterances results, in 
certain circumstances, in their expression of borderline propositions; 
 (2) That a borderline case item is the subject of a borderline proposition. 
The following remarks are offered under the aegis of this natural proposal. 
 In earlier work, I characterised the notion of a quandary as follows:25  
Proposition P presents a thinker T with a Quandary in circumstances (of evaluation) C26 if and only 
if, in C, 
 (i) T does not know whether or not P 
 (ii) T does not know any way of knowing whether or not P 
 (iii) T does not know that there is any way of knowing whether or not P 
 (iv) T does not know that it is (metaphysically) possible to know whether or not P 
I also suggested that it would be wrong to add 
 (v) T knows that it is not (metaphysically) possible to know whether or not P 
for reasons included in and elaborated upon by the discussion of the preceding sections. It is a 
consequence of the proposal sans clause (v) that the less cognitively adept a thinker, the easier it 
will be to confront her with quandary—since she only has not to know various things. Indeed she 
doesn’t even have to be able to wonder whether or not P. Clearly there is therefore no prospect of 
capturing the notion of a borderline proposition by reference to the propensities of actual thinkers 
to be put in quandary by it. We will need to consider thinkers of some degree of conceptual and 
cognitive sophistication. 
 A first shot at a characterisation in terms of quandary of a borderline proposition might run 
as follows: 
P is borderline in circumstances C iff a conceptually and perceptually fully competent thinker T could be 
put in quandary by P in C 
The intuitive thought is that, while quandary is never a mandated response to a borderline 
situation, it is always a possible one quite consistently with full and proper cognitive functioning 
and grasp of all relevant concepts. In a clear case, by contrast, to fall into quandary is not 
                                                
25 Wright [2001] 
26 The relativity to circumstances of evaluation is for the obvious reason: the very same proposition can be a 
quandary in one set of circumstances and clearly true in another. But the relativity might be compounded for 
vagueness-unrelated reasons if one’s conception of proposition allows propositional truth to be relative to time, 
or standards, etc. 
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consistent with full and proper cognitive functioning in appropriate respects together with grasp of 
all relevant concepts, since the clear cases mandate a verdict. Notice that this strategy of 
characterisation grants that quandary is not a characteristic mental state associated with the 
appraisal of a borderline proposition—not if “characteristic” means widespread and typical. It is 
the possibility of quandary, consistently with full competence in all relevant respects, that is 
crucial, not the actual prevalence of it. 
  The first shot characterisation, however, is still manifestly insufficient. The problem is that 
there are non vagueness-related quandaries. A thinker of arbitrary conceptual and perceptual—
indeed, mathematical— competence may very well meet all four clauses with respect to 
Goldbach's Conjecture, for example: a proposition in which there is no relevant form of vagueness, 
and which accordingly has no claim to be a borderline proposition. And moral dilemmas hold out 
the prospect of another region of quandary: finding myself in a situation in which all possible 
courses of action conflict with one or another of my values, I may consider myself apprised of all 
relevant non-moral facts and quite reasonably be perfectly agnostic about the prospects of 
adjudicating between the competing values concerned. In that case P, i.e., some proposition of the 
form: “A is the best thing to do in the circumstances”, may very well present me with a quandary. 
True, there are almost certain to be vague concepts involved in P; but it seems likely to be a 
misdiagnosis of the source of the quandary posed by a moral dilemma to locate it there. 
 Goldbach’s conjecture and the wider class of propositions that it represents—propositions, 
whether or not mathematical, for which we have no assurance of decidability—are, I think, easy to 
exclude by a well-motivated modification of the first shot proposal. What is striking about these 
cases is that quandary is mandated—a fully competent thinker ought to regard Goldbach as 
presenting a quandary. That is in crucial contrast to the situation of borderline cases, at least as 
construed by liberalism. So it looks as though the first shot should be followed by a second shot 
beginning like this:  
P is borderline in circumstances C iff  
(i) a conceptually and perceptually fully competent thinker T could, consistently with those competences, 
be put in quandary by P in C; and 
(ii) Such a T is not required to be put in quandary by P in C; and…. 
—though only so beginning, since something now needs to be added to address the quandary of 
moral dilemma. There are other possible quandaries too: if one is persuaded of the possibility of 
faultless disagreement in matters of taste, for example, there looks to be potential for quandary in 
the situation of a bystander considering which of the protagonists in such a disagreement may be 
right.  
 There is now a tactical issue. We could proceed by trying to track through all possible 
varieties of quandary, hoping to find a clause for each to distinguish it from the vagueness-related 
cases. But it is not clear what degree of insight might be expected along that path. Better, if we 
can, to say something which captures the nature of vagueness-related quandary in one cast, as it 
were, thereby systematically contrasting it with all the other kinds. How might that be 
accomplished? 
 Here is a tempting thought: perhaps this is the place to re-invoke VPB. It is not implausible 
that either of the conflicting claims in a moral dilemma might—by one for whom it is not a 
dilemma—be endorsed as strongly as you like without any necessary implication of some form of 
incompetence. Likewise for the ingredient claims in a putatively faultless disagreement on a matter 
of taste. But can any thinker who is fully competent in relevant respects endorse a verdict about a 
vague judgement strongly—as strongly as you like—which, for another relevantly fully competent 
thinker, presents a quandary? In a borderline case, where quandary is consistent with competence, 
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must not that fact surface in at least some, perhaps quite significant degree of qualification in the 
confidence of one who, as according to liberalism she is entitled, endorses a verdict? If so, we can 
add to the second shot along the following lines: 
(iii) T is required to repose at most a relatively low degree of confidence (VPB) in P (or its negation) in C, 
and hope thereby to have at least the overall shape of a successful characterisation, (even if further 
refinement will certainly be needed.) 
 However there is, if an earlier point is correct, a problem for this— the same problem 
caused by our friend Hugh and the possibility of “maximal opinionation” for the general idea that 
VBP is a (non-contingently) characteristic mental state of vague judgement. If maximal 
opinionation is consistent with mastery of vague concepts, VPB is at most contingently so 
characteristic—and the requirement proposed in clause (iii) as formulated is not a requirement. I 
see no way round this objection at present. 
 What we should like to propose would be a clause that captured the idea that in borderline 
cases, a thinker who is put into quandary will be so because of the nature of the prevailing 
circumstances of evaluation and the vagueness of the judgement concerned: the quandary is an 
upshot of the vagueness. But of course to say that would be to surrender the project of accounting 
for the nature of vagueness in terms of the propensity to induce quandary in fully competent 
thinkers— rather we will have slipped into thinking of vagueness as an underlying cause of the 
attitude of quandary, whose nature will therefore have to be explained independently.27  
 Surely, though, the basic thought has to be right that it goes with the nature of the kind of 
vagueness we are concerned with that quandary may be induced without demanding explanation 
by defective cognitive or conceptual competence. And when quandary is so induced, it is 
presumably induced by something. The project of attempting a broadly attitudinal-psychological 
response to the characterisation problem means that we cannot rest content with an account of the 
cause that involves an unreconstructed appeal to the vagueness of the proposition concerned. But it 
may quite properly appeal to a certain kind of characteristic property of the relevant circumstances 
of evaluation— if we can find one. And surely we can. The very form of the sorites paradox itself 
provides the means. All the vague concepts with which we are concerned are, after all, sorites-
prone—that defines the kind of vagueness with which we are concerned. And every sorites 
paradox involves gradual change in the values of some parameter, Π, with the following 
characteristic: that there is a finite strict ordering of such values whose early instances provide for 
clear cases of F and whose later ones for clear cases of its contrary.  The kind of quandary 
distinctive of vagueness is one induced by this process of gradual change— or more accurately, 
since quandary is not restricted to soritical contexts, one induced, in the circumstances in question, 
by the value for the relevant parameter taken by the object of the judgment that presents a 
quandary. Call such a parameter a parameter of supervenience for F. For bald, a parameter of 
supervenience will be number and distribution of hairs on the scalp; for heap of sand, a parameter 
of supervenience will be number and arrangement of grains of sand; for red, a parameter of 
supervenience will be colour. I take it these ideas are sufficiently clear for the present purpose. 
 Perhaps, then, the following clauses point in a potentially profitable direction: 
P is borderline in circumstances C iff P configures some concept F for which Π is a parameter of 
supervenience such that 
                                                
27 Schiffer confronts an exactly analogous problem when he speaks of VPB* as “F-concept driven” in borderline 
cases—for development of the challenge, see my [2006]. Schiffer responds in Schiffer [2006].  
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(i) A conceptually and perceptually fully competent thinker T could be put in quandary for P in C by the 
value taken by Π in C; and 
(ii) A conceptually and perceptually fully competent thinker T is not required to be put in quandary for P in 
C. 
However it is important to keep in mind the general pressures from which this proposal springs. In 
general there is no hope, I think, of a successful characterisation of vagueness in terms of the 
attitudinal states of those who make vague judgements unless we include some form of causal 
constraint on the provenance of these states. Any successful such account will therefore be 
bipartite: it will proffer some putatively distinctive attitudinal feature(s) of vague judgement and it 
will tie significant instantiations of it/them to causes that are somehow an essential feature of the 
broader landscape of vague judgement. What I have suggested in this section is merely a rather 
simple-minded illustration of this model: the selected distinctive feature is the association of 
vagueness with judgemental paralysis in certain circumstances— glossed as quandary—and the 
relevant feature of the broader landscape is the value taken by the parameter, gradually shifting in 
a suitable sorites paradox, on which instantiation and non-instantiation of the relevant vague 
concept supervenes. 
 It remains to observe that if VPB is a well-conceived phenomenon at all, —which I do not 
doubt, —then there has of course to be scope for other versions of this general form of bipartite 
proposal which seek to centralise it, rather than quandary as characterised. Such versions will 
presumably be more congenial to Schiffer and may well have advantages. I regard the area as very 
open. 
  
§5  The Logic of Vagueness 
There is no immediate connection between the proposal that borderline cases should somehow be 
characterised in terms of a certain distinctive kind of partial belief and a treatment of the sorites 
paradox. Schiffer effects one by proposing a simple set of characterisations of the degrees of 
VPB—degrees of V-credibility—that a rational subject will assign to compounds of vague 
statements on the basis of the degree of V-credibility that she assigns to their constituents.  The 
matrices he proposes follow the pattern of Lukasiewicz’s tables for infinitely many valued logics. 
Thus the V-credibility of a negation is 1 minus the V-credibility of the negated statement; the V-
credibility of a conjunction is the minimum of the V-credibilities of its conjuncts; and the V-
credibility of a disjunction is the maximum of those of the disjuncts. The universal and existential 
quantifiers respectively take the greatest lower bound and least upper bound of the V-credibilities 
possessed by their instances. 
 Now consider a sorites paradox, with a major premise taken in the form, ∼(∃x)(Fx & ∼Fx′). 
Classically (and intuitionistically) this forms an inconsistent triad with the two minor premises, F0 
and ∼Fk, with k selected so as to ensure that the latter is effectively incontrovertible, while F0 is 
beyond dispute.  So it is natural to think that first base for any solution must be to acknowledge 
that the sorites reasoning reduces the major premise to absurdity and so demonstrates ∼ ∼(∃x)(Fx 
& ∼Fx′). The question is then how to block the classical entailment of the unwelcome ‘unpalatable 
existential’, (∃x)(Fx & ∼Fx′), or somehow make out that it is not really unpalatable.  The 
landscape changes however with Schiffer’s proposals. This becomes clear if we ask what degree of 
V-credibility attaches to the unpalatable existential. It will be the maximum of the V-credibilities 
of the k instances: conjunctions of the form, Fx & ∼Fx′, whose V-credibility in turn will be the 
minimum of those of their conjuncts. In the polar regions this will be very low, since one or the 
other conjunct will be roundly disbelieved. But the figure will climb as one enters the borderline 
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region, culminating, at least in principle, with a V-credibility of, or very close to .5 (though never 
higher.) So the unpalatable existential, and hence also its negation— the major premise for the 
paradox—will also have V-credibility very close to .5. The upshot is that, according to the 
Lukasiewicz-style matrices, both are paradigms of indeterminacy.  
 Is that a good result? It may seem not—after all, the major premise is very plausible; that is 
why we had a paradox. So don't we want it to turn out to have quite a high VPB? Well, yes—
inasmuch as we want to explain the plausibility of the major premise (in particular, its plausibility 
over its negation) but – you might suppose—also no, since we have to fault it somehow. 
Suppose—as I take it Schiffer intends—that the computation we have just sketched is meant to be 
normative: to deliver a measure of VPB that it is rational to have. Had the computation delivered 
the result that the major premise did have quite a high VPB, then the account would be saying that 
we ought to accept it over its negation—in effect, confirming the rational acceptability of the 
premises of the paradox! So it is good that we don’t get that result. But as it is, the result is that 
rationally there is absolutely nothing to choose between the major premise of the sorites and its 
negation. That leaves the pull that the premise exerts on us—which is the whole source of the 
paradox—as unexplained, indeed as irrational. And surely, one may protest, it is not irrational—
after all, the negation is tantamount to assertion of the existence of a sharp cut-off, i.e. a denial of 
the vagueness of F in the series in question, which is a datum of the problem. 
 Why on Schiffer’s account does the negative existential form of the major premise for the 
Sorites attract us? Rationally, if his matrices for VPB are on the right lines, we should find nothing 
to favour it over its negation. I am not sure how Schiffer sees the options here. One thing he can 
say is that we are under no pressure to choose—since the law of excluded middle, conceived as a 
general schema, is foursquare indeterminate too (an exercise for the reader.) That suggests the 
following diagnostic: the major premise attracts us because acceptance of its negation repels. But 
the truth is that there is no rational pressure to accept either if the law of excluded middle is 
indeterminate. However this leaves unexplained why the unpalatable existential is unpalatable. For 
if it really is tantamount to a denial of the vagueness of F in the series in question, it is false, not 
indeterminate. And if it isn’t, the repulsiveness of that denial doesn't explain its unpalatability. 
 How exactly, in any case, does getting in position to regard the major premise as 
indeterminate dispose of the paradox? It may seem obvious: the paradox was that we seemed 
driven to a contradiction from acceptable premises—the contradiction, e.g., that a man with 
exactly 37 cents both is not—of course—and is—by the sorites—rich. Now, since one of the 
sorites premises turns out to be indeterminate, we are no longer under any pressure to accept one 
of the components in the contradiction. 
 What is salient, though, —and of course Schiffer is absolutely aware of and explicit about 
this—is that that cannot be his whole story. There is a commitment in his account to a kind of 
over-kill. Not merely have we disposed of the acceptability of the major premise. We have also got 
into a position where we have to regard it as indeterminate whether the sorites reasoning is valid. 
For since the minor premise is true, and the conclusion is false, and since— at least for Schiffer—
the indeterminacy of P is to be consistent with the truth of P, the situation is one where it is 
consistent with everything we know that the sorites premises are both true and its conclusion 
false—so it's consistent with everything we know that it is an invalid argument. A corollary, as 
Schiffer observes, is that—since we may run the sorites just using hundreds of special conditional 
premises instead of the usual major premise—we have to regard the validity of modus ponens as 
an indeterminate issue too! Is this something that can be lived with? 
 There may be some temptation to reply that Schiffer’s account treats the validity of modus 
ponens, or other classical rules, as indeterminate only when we are involved with indeterminate 
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premises and/or conclusions. Elsewhere there is no problem. But I don't think such an attempt to 
ring-fence the singularity makes sense. Validity—at least, classical validity—turns on 
compossibilities of truth-value. If certain argument patterns have instances involving indeterminate 
premises and false conclusions, — or more graphically, true premises and indeterminate 
conclusions28—then they are not known to be truth-preserving. So why should we trust them 
anywhere? And in any case, don't we need reliable rules in terms of which to bring out the 
commitments of a thinker who takes a view—however qualified—on an indeterminate issue? 
 I have little space to pursue this fundamental matter further. To be sure Schiffer’s 
predicament—if that is what it is—is a function of his choice of the Lukasciewicz-style matrices, 
and they have independent discomforts in this setting; for example, they mispredict the level of 
partial belief which normal thinkers will repose in conjunctions of vague but incompatible 
conjuncts, and they predict variations in the V-credibility of conjunctions of the form, Fk and ~Fk′, 
k and k′ adjacent in a sorites series, which are surely not empirically confirmed—one would expect 
a uniformly low valuation, irrespective of the place in the series of k.29 But the point I would like 
to emphasise in closing is that the position for which Schiffer proposes to settle is one in which he 
has, given other things he accepts, to doubt that certain classically valid inferences are knowledge-
preserving. The inference for example, from F0 and ~Fk, for suitably ‘distant’ k, to the relevant 
unpalatable existential is classically valid and has—one would suppose— known premises. But the 
conclusion, on Schiffer’s calculation, is indeterminate—so cannot be claimed to be known. 
Moreover if with Schiffer, we accept (VE), we will have to say that it cannot be known. In that 
case — whatever the situation with truth—classical validity fails to preserve knowledge. 
Strikingly, that is, in effect, exactly the intuitionists' complaint about it: that it permits the 
derivation from warranted premises of conclusions for which there is no warrant— in particular, 
none elicitable from the warrant for the premises and the derivation. My own treatment of this 
agenda is precisely fashioned around argument for and consequences of the thesis that classical 
logic is epistemically non-conservative where vagueness is concerned. Schiffer's views commit 
him to the same. What he has yet to provide is his own account of the shape a logic should assume 
to remedy the defect. 
******* 
The forgoing has concentrated on points of disagreement and difference.  It would be entirely 
inappropriate to end on anything but a note of admiration for the work I have been commenting on. 
For the philosopher who wishes to better understand the nature of linguistic competence and 
linguistic representation, vagueness presents challenges of exceptional importance and the greatest 
intellectual difficulty. Stephen Schiffer has responded to these challenges with a rare mix of 
breadth of philosophical vision, resourcefulness and dialectical and technical expertise. I look 
forward to the products of his continuing engagement.30 
 
 
                                                
28 Consider the inference from the minor premise and negation of the conclusion of the Sorites to the negation of 
the major premise. 
29 Elia Zardini has suggested in discussion that a restriction of the Lukasiewicz clauses to independent 
propositions would be a natural and attractive way of trying to get around these awkwardnesses, (assuming a 
case can be made that ~Fk′ is relevantly negatively dependent on Fk.) 
30 I am most grateful to Elia Zardini for detailed comments on the penultimate draft, and to him and other 
members of the Arché Vagueness project for feedback on various of the ideas herein canvassed at various 
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